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Abstract English-language Wikipedia is constantly
being plagued by vandalistic contributions on a massive
scale. In order to fight them its volunteer contributors
deploy an array of software tools and autonomous bots.
After an analysis of their functioning and the ‘coactivity’ in
use between humans and bots, this research ‘discloses’ the
moral issues that emerge from the combined patrolling by
humans and bots. Administrators provide the stronger tools
only to trusted users, thereby creating a new hierarchical
layer. Further, surveillance exhibits several troubling fea-
tures: questionable profiling practices (concerning
anonymous users in particular), the use of the controversial
measure of reputation (under consideration), ‘oversurveil-
lance’ where quantity trumps quality, and a prospective
loss of the required moral skills whenever bots take over
from humans. The most troubling aspect, though, is that
Wikipedia has become a Janus-faced institution. One face
is the basic platform of MediaWiki software, transparent to
all. Its other face is the anti-vandalism system, which, in
contrast, is opaque to the average user, in particular as a
result of the algorithms and neural networks in use. Finally
it is argued that this secrecy impedes a much needed dis-
cussion to unfold; a discussion that should focus on a
‘rebalancing’ of the anti-vandalism system and the devel-
opment of more ethical information practices towards
contributors.
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Introduction
Communities that thrive on the contributions from their
respective ‘crowds’ have been with us for several decades
now. The contents involved may be source code, text, or
pictures; the products created may be software, news, ref-
erence works, videos, maps, and the like. As argued before
(de Laat 2012b, using Dutton 2008), the basic parameters
of such open content communities are twofold: on the one
hand their technological web design, which may range
from sharing (1.0), co-contributing (2.0), to co-creation
(3.0); on the other hand their conditions of admission to the
collaborative work process, which may be fully open or
more restricted (say, only for experts). Some telling
examples are Linux, Slashdot, Reddit, NowPublic, Wiki-
pedia, and YouTube.
Open channels of communication invite all kinds of
contributions to the collective process. Inevitably, they also
solicit contents that are disruptive and damaging to the
goals of the community: off-topic, inappropriate, improper,
offensive, malicious content and the like. Obviously, this
issue is most urgent in those open-content communities
that focus on co-contribution or co-creation without any
restrictions on entry. Most of such ‘open collaboration’
projects (a term coined by Forte and Lampe 2013), there-
fore, have had no choice but to develop systems that detect
improper contributions and subsequently eliminate them in
appropriate ways. In short, anti-intrusion systems have
been introduced.
Several varieties can be discerned.1 A default solution is
that professional editors of the site police contributions for
improper content, before and/or after publication. Most
social news sites and citizen journals are a case in point. As
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a rule, though, the incoming flow of content is simply too
large to be handled in this way alone; therefore the crowds
are called to the rescue. Such help may take various forms.
First, contributors can be asked to scout for improper
content as well. Any purported transgressions are to be
reported to the managing editors who will deal with them.
If necessary, additional workers are hired for the modera-
tion of reported contents. Facebook and YouTube report-
edly outsource this kind of moderation globally to small
companies that all together employ thousands of lowly-
paid workers. Many of the call centres involved, for
example, are located in the Philippines (Chen 2014). Sec-
ondly, contributors can be invited to vote on new content:
usually a plus or a minus. It was, of course, Digg that
pioneered this scheme (‘digging’). As a result of this vot-
ing, contributions rise to public prominence (or visibility)
more quickly, or fade away more quickly. Quality gets
sorted out. Both reporting and voting are common practice
now in social news sites and citizen journals. Thirdly,
contributors can be invited to change contributions that are
deemed inappropriate. Usually, of course, this means
deleting the content in question. It is common practice in
communities that operate according to a wiki format that
allows contributors unrestricted write-access. Cases in
point are Citizendium, Wikinews, and Wikipedia. Finally,
contributors can be invited to spot improper contribu-
tions—but only those who have proved themselves trust-
worthy are allowed to act accordingly. This hierarchical
option is common practice in communities of open-source
software: after identifying them as genuine bugs, only
developers (with write-access) may correct such edits by
eliminating or fixing them in the main code tree.
In order to present a unified framework in the above I
have been talking indiscriminately about improper and/or
disruptive content. Such neutral language of course con-
ceals a lot of variety between communities concerning
what is to be counted as such. Moreover, impropriety and
disruption only exist in the eyes of the particular beholder.
These observations immediately raise many associated
questions. What are the definitions of impropriety in use?
Who effectively decides on what is to count as such? Is it
the crowds that have been solicited or only a select few? If
the latter, how did the select few obtain their position of
power: by appointment from above or by some democratic
procedure? Ultimately the crucial question is: do such
decisions on what counts as proper content bring us any
closer to the particular ‘truth’ being sought?
Obviously, the answers are bound to vary depending on
which type of community is under scrutiny. Let me just
state here a few, select generalities. As concerns the kind of
content being pursued, some communities are after an
exchange of opinions about topical issues (social news,
citizen journals), others are on a quest for the ‘facts’ about
certain fields of interest (encyclopedias) or for source code
that meets certain technical criteria (open-source software);
their criteria for propriety obviously differ widely.
Correspondingly, coming closer to the ‘truth’ is much
harder for the latter types of community than for the for-
mer. Further, the size of the community involved matters:
the larger it becomes, the more tendencies towards strati-
fication and differentiation of power are likely to manifest
themselves. Moreover, a multitude of elites may be forming,
each with their own agendas.
Keeping these questions in mind let us return to the
phenomenon of disruptive contributions and focus on their
scale. It can safely be asserted that in the largest of all
open-content encyclopedias, Wikipedia, disruption has
reached gigantic proportions. For the English language
version of the encyclopedia in particular, estimates hover
around 9000 malicious edits a day. A few reasons behind
this vandalism on a large scale can easily be identified. On
the one hand, the Wikipedia corpus involved has assumed
large proportions (almost five million entries), making it a
very attractive target for visitors of bad intent; on the other,
Wikipedia allows co-creation (3.0) with full write-access
for all, a collaborative tool that is very susceptible to dis-
ruptive actions by mala fide visitors.
From the beginning of Wikipedia, in 2001, several
approaches to curb vandalism have been tried. Some of
them have been accepted and endured; others have been
discarded along the way. In the following, the various tools
and approaches are spelled out, with a particular emphasis
on the ones that are still being used. It is shown that within
Wikipedia a whole collection of anti-vandalism tools has
been developed. These instruments are being unfolded in a
massive campaign of collective monitoring of edits. This
vigilance is exercised continuously, on a 24/7 basis. In the
process, human Wikipedians are being mobilized as
patrollers, from administrators at the top to ordinary users
at the bottom; in addition, several autonomous bots are
doing their part. In a short detour, this system of surveil-
lance is analysed from the viewpoint of robotic ethics, and
shown to conform to the recent trend of ‘coactivity’
between humans and bots.
In the central part of this article, subsequently, the moral
questions that emerge from this mixed human/bot surveil-
lance are discussed. The analysis is to be seen as an
exercise in ‘disclosive ethics’ (Brey 2000): uncovering
features of the anti-vandalism system in place that are
largely opaque and appear to be morally neutral—but, in
actual fact, are not so. Based on a careful reading of
Wikipedian pages that relate to vandalism fighting and a
period of participant observation as a practising patroller I
draw the following conclusions. As for power, next to
administrators, strong anti-vandalism tools are shown to be
only distributed to trusted users, thus creating dominance
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for a new hierarchical layer. As far as surveillance is
concerned, filtering of edits becomes questionable when it
focuses on editor characteristics like anonymity or repu-
tation. Is Wikipedia engaging in objectionable profiling
practices? Further, the system raises the issues of ‘over-
surveillance’ and of the loss of the display of moral skills
towards newcomers. Moreover, concerning the institution
as a whole, the system of surveillance operates largely as
an invisible and opaque technology, hidden from sight to
Wikipedian contributors at large. It is argued that as a
result, the encyclopedia’s governance has become Janus-
faced. The wiki platform is an open invitation for all to
participate, exemplifying the assumption of trust, but
underneath tight surveillance is exercised that starts from
the assumption of continuous suspicion. Finally it is argued
that in view of these objections the anti-vandalism system
needs rebalancing. Also, fair information practices towards
contributors need to be developed that highlight the ins and
outs of anti-vandalism operations and ask for consent
concerning the use of their contributions.
Anti-vandalism tools in Wikipedia
Basically, vandalism fighting in Wikipedia consists of two
phases: edits to entries are selected and subsequently in-
spected. Any vandalistic edit that has been detected is cor-
rected by its deletion (‘reversion’, ‘undoing’); usually, an
edit comment is attached making mention of vandalism.
Performing these steps has always been part and parcel of the
write-access permission granted to (almost) all users. The
buttons involved that have to be pressed are readily available.
This default mode of vandalism fighting—to be denoted the
‘basic mode’—soon revealed itself to be insufficient in view
of the rising quantity of vandalism. From about 2005
onwards, therefore, a wide range of new tools has been
developed by Wikipedians themselves to remedy the
situation and achieve more anti-vandalism power. I will not
try to give an overview that respects the chronological order
in which these were developed; instead, I focus on their basic
functions. Moreover, I only present a selection of the avail-
able tools: those that are most convenient and/or powerful
and (therefore) mostly in use.
The first phase of selection of edits for inspection has
been facilitated as follows. Patrol options have been
developed that allow seeing a complete list of recent
changes to all entries. The list is refreshed continuously. A
common way to obtain these edits is by means of RSS
feeds or IRC. In order not to be overwhelmed by this
massive flood of edits, filtering options have been devel-
oped. Three options can be distinguished.
First, one can filter out types of entries involved. One
may focus on edits in a specific namespace; say the main
namespace only (the entries themselves). Further, users
may compose a list of specific entries they are interested in
(their own personal ‘watchlist’), and then select all recent
changes to that watchlist only. Another focus that has been
enabled is the sensitive category of entries about living
people. Secondly, one may choose to focus on the content
of contributed edits: those with bad words, those with
massive blanking, those that delete a whole entry, etc.
Blacklists of suspect words and expressions are assembled
for this purpose. Thirdly, specific types of editors may be
targeted. A focus on anonymous contributors, on new
accounts, on warned contributors, on users that figure on
one’s personal ‘blacklist’—the possibilities are endless.
Similarly, categories of users can be excluded from scru-
tiny: no administrator edits, no bot edits, no whitelisted
users, etc. Further, modern tools allow combining various
filtering options. For example, a focus on large deletions as
committed by IP-accounts can be realized.
After edits have been selected, the second phase of in-
spection of edits begins. Obviously, any detected vandal-
istic edit gets reverted. But beyond this action, several
buttons have been developed that trigger specific actions
deemed appropriate. A patroller may easily leave a warn-
ing message on the talk page of the supposed vandal, ask
for administrator intervention against the supposed vandal
(‘blocking’), ask for the page to be ‘protected’ (i.e., lower
level users may no longer contribute), propose the entry to
be deleted as a whole (even ‘speedily’), etc. Another
powerful option is a ‘rollback’ button: after a vandalistic
edit has been spotted, it permits not only the reversion of
the edit involved but of all antecedent edits to the entry as
committed by the same suspected vandal as well, reverting
them all in one go. It reverts a whole consecutive series of
(supposedly) vandalistic edits, not just the most recent one.
All these options to raise the anti-vandalism powers of
Wikipedian patrollers have found their way into various
concrete tools (for a selection of them, see Table 1). I will
mention some of them here. On the #cvn-wp-en freenode
channel (accessible via Chatzilla, a Firefox extension), IRC
bots (such as SentryBot or CVNBot1) display a continuous
stream of edits that are deemed to be suspicious. Moreover,
the various reasons for suspicion that apply are mentioned,
each reason with its own colour (possible gibberish, large
removal, edit by blacklisted editor, edit by IP-account,
etc.). Vandal Fighter offers about the same functionalities,
though the reasons for suspicion are rendered more suc-
cinctly. Lupin is a tool using RSS feeds for displaying
recent edits and filtering them by various criteria; subse-
quently, various buttons are available that come into play
after edit reversion. Twinkle installs a menu of buttons on
the patroller’s screen to facilitate edit correction. The
rollback tool, finally, consists of just one button on the
patroller’s screen for swift reversal (cf. above).
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Recently, though, with the tools just mentioned already in
place, the fight against vandalism received a giant boost by
two more or less independent developments. For one thing,
edit filters (or abuse filters) as a means to prevent intrusion
have been developed. These are extensions to the Wikipe-
dian platform that set specific controls on user activities:
whenever a user tries to commit an edit, it first has to pass
through these filters before ending up in the encyclopedia
itself. At the time of writing, after severe testing and dis-
cussions, close to a hundred filters have been approved of and
are activated on the platform. They can have many a focus,
but vandalistic actions are particularly well represented. A
particular watch is on the combination of new and/or
unregistered users performing such actions. Upon spotting a
potentially disruptive edit, various automated actions are
possible. The edit may be tagged as potentially vandalistic;
such tags can be focussed on by subsequent patrollers. The
user may be warned (‘are you sure you want to proceed?’),
possibly preventing the edit to be submitted at all. The edit
may be stopped (‘disallow’): it does not pass the filter; the
editor is warned in appropriate ways. Finally, filters can have
built-in so-called ‘throttle’: disruptive actions are allowed up
to a threshold (say blanking large chunks of text up to once
per hour). Passing that threshold triggers the filter into action.
Note that most filters in use are public, that is, their func-
tioning can be looked up on a Wikipedian page. Some,
however, are kept private and cannot be inspected by the
ordinary user. This is done to keep potential vandals in the
dark about the possibilities of evading the filter in question
(for all remarks in this paragraph, see the links mentioned
under WP:Edit filter).
Another recent boost to fighting vandalism, in a carefully
tailored way this time, is provided by computational ap-
proaches to detect vandalism. Research in this area has
crystallized into four categories of algorithm (Adler et al.
2011). Algorithms may focus on language features (like bad
words, pronoun frequencies), on language-independent
textual features (like the use of capitals, changes to numer-
ical content, deletion of text), on metadata of edits (like time
and place of the edit, anonymity, absence of revision com-
ment), or on the editor’s reputation as a trustworthy con-
tributor. For the latter measure various approaches are in
circulation (for reputation as conceived of in the so-called
‘Wikitrust model’ see Adler and de Alfaro 2007). Computer
scientists have been struggling with the question which
approach to the detection of vandalism is the most fruitful.
Based on a computer tournament with all approaches in the
competition the provisional answer seems to be: a combi-
nation of all four algorithms works best (Adler et al. 2011).
These vandalism detection algorithms are useful
weapons in the struggle against vandalism. They can be
enlisted as useful assistants to humans in the phase of
selecting edits. If so instructed, algorithms can calculate
and assign a probabilistic vandalism score to each and
every fresh edit that has passed the abuse filters and comes
in. These scores are used to make ordered lists of edits,
with the most suspect edits on top. ‘Engines’ of this kind
have found two ways of employment.
On the one hand, they have been incorporated as detection
engines in ‘assisted editing’ tools. The prime example is the
STiki tool (Table 1). At its back-end, all fresh edits from the
Wikipedian servers are continuously monitored for vandal-
ism and vandalism scores assigned to them. The method
employed in the original implementation was the third,
metadata approach; currently, the neural network approach
has been enabled also (cf. below). At the front-end, subse-
quently, using IRC, suspect edits are served to human
patrollers in an ordered queue. The filtering task has
Table 1 Anti-vandalism tools
used in Wikipedia and their
affordances beyond the ‘basic
mode’ of fighting vandalism
(selection; cf.
WP:OLDSCHOOL)
Phase: Selection of edits Inspection of edits
Operators with their tools
Human operator using Vandal Fighter Use of filters
Human operator using #cvn-wp-en Use of filters (also in combination)
Human operator using Lupin Use of filters Use of buttons
Human operator using Twinkle Use of buttons
Human operator using rollback Use of button
Human operator using WPCVN Use of scoring algorithms
Human operator using Huggle Use of scoring algorithms Use of buttons
Human operator using STiki Use of scoring algorithms Use of buttons
Autonomous bot Use of scoring algorithms Autonomous action
Notes Before their potential acceptance, edits are filtered by several edit (or abuse) filters; ‘basic mode’
means that only the basic facilities of the Wikipedian architecture are employed (no additional tools are
used); tools mentioned in the table can sometimes usefully be employed together (e.g., Lupin and Twinkle;
WPCVN and Twinkle); WPCVN is out of order since January 2014; a recently developed tool, igloo, is not
included in the table while still in alpha development
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effectively been taken over by the machine: humans just
work through the queue. Edits can be accepted (classified as
innocent or pass, the latter optionmeaning the patroller is not
quite sure), or reverted (classified as good-faith revert if no
malicious intent seems to be present, or as vandalism if such
intent is obvious). Good-faith reversions can be commented
on; the diagnosis of vandalism automatically triggers a
warning note to be placed on the vandal’s talk page.A similar
‘assisted editing’ tool for the whole process is Huggle
(Table 1). Fresh edits are monitored and rated according to a
mixture of language, textual and metadata features. Subse-
quently, in a default queue, these are served to human
operators at the front-end, who have a repertoire of actions at
their disposal quite similar to the ones described above for
STiki.
On the other hand, vandalism detection algorithms have
been extended and turned into fully autonomous bots (see
Table 1) (for a useful overview of the bot landscape in
Wikipedia, for several other purposes than anti-vandalism
as well, one is referred to Livingstone 2012: 126–132,
180–227 and Nielsen 2014: 17, 35–38). After severe testing
they may be let loose on the Wikipedian edit stream. While
hundreds of bots are currently in operation, several of them
are tailored towards vandalism (another 10–20 of the kind
have now been ‘retired’). They routinely scan incoming
edits for vandalism right after they are published on
Wikipedia. A bot intervenes like any human patroller: after
identifying a vandalistic edit, it reverts the edit and leaves a
warning note on the vandal’s talk page. Which kind of
algorithm detection is being used? In the beginning most
bots relied on the first method: language features. Black-
lists (of words) were commonly used. Of late, the four
classical methods listed above have (largely) been set
aside. Instead, the most recent bots operate as neural net-
works that gradually learn to distinguish between bad edits
and good edits. In order to learn the bots have to be fed
continuously with edits as actually classified by humans.
Especially this latter type of bot is a promising develop-
ment. The top scorer among them is ClueBotNG, which
can boast of almost three million reversions in total (since
2011). It typically checks edits within 5 seconds of their
appearance and reverts about one of them every minute.
Assessment of the robotic landscape
So the fighting of vandalism on Wikipedia has assumed
large proportions, mobilizing literally thousands of volun-
teers and several bots. Now, how is this amplified process
to be understood? Is it business as usual though on a larger
scale, or has the process assumed a different character? Are
the changes only of a quantitative kind, or also of a qual-
itative kind?
Geiger and Ribes (2010), elaborating on how the
Wikipedian process of ‘banning a vandal’ has been trans-
formed, firmly take the latter position. They argue that the
combined force of humans and bots allows a process of
‘distributed cognition’ to unfold, in which collaborators
unknown to each other are knitted together in the common
purpose of eradicating vandalism. In it, the talk page plays
a pivotal role: all warning messages end up there, enabling
a coordinated response to ongoing vandalism. So it is only
by the creation and deployment of the anti-vandalism
tools discussed above that vandalism patrolling becomes
possible at all. A sea change has taken place.
I do not quite agree with their diagnosis. Fighting van-
dalism has been possible in Wikipedia from the beginning.
Focussing on specific types of edit or editors has always
been possible (though cumbersome); reverting edits while
leaving comments about the reversal and/or warning mes-
sages on talk pages has always been possible as well
(though cumbersome). I want to argue that it is the creation
of the Wikipedian platform and the associated wiki tools
that must be seen as the cradle for distributed cognition in
Wikipedian fashion. The revolution took place in 2001, not
around 2011. Of course, the developed tools combined with
the large influx of human volunteers have enabled a much
larger scale of vandalism fighting. Patrollers may work
vastly more efficiently with these tools. Only edits singled
out as suspect have to be inspected, only a few buttons
have to be pressed for dealing with edits found to be
wanting. Without the computational powers involved in
particular, vandalism fighting would not have ‘scaled’ so
easily (from watching over a corpus of a handful of entries
to almost 5 million entries by now). And without those
computational powers, Wikipedia would have been cor-
rupted on a large scale.
Geiger and Ribes (2010:124) also mention ‘delegated
cognition’: parts of the patrolling task are shifted to com-
putational tools. Edit filtering can be steered by algorithms;
edit filtering, inspection, and correction combined can be
performed by autonomous bots. It is this delegation that
stands out as novel, meriting closer attention indeed. How
is this shifting of the burden to be understood?
Let me first remark that the anti-vandalism bots in
operation can be interpreted as an instance of ‘explicit
ethical agents’ (Moor 2006). They perform calculations
and decide to act depending on the outcome, similar to
chess robots. Since they can make decisions on their own,
they may exhibit surprising behaviour. If this interpreta-
tion is accepted, what about the responsibility of humans
vis-a`-vis their robotic creations? In what ways are
responsibilities for their actions to be distributed between
them? In particular, can a responsibility gap be detected
here (cf. Johnson 2013 for an overview of this issue)? One
position is to argue that, since their behaviour is no longer
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under the control of their creators/operators, the bots
involved are to be considered as responsible agents in their
own right—a position advanced by Matthias and Sparrow.
Another position is to argue that their creators/operators are
still to be blamed, either from the point of view of the
juridical profession where this is quite normal (Santoro), or
on account of their professional responsibility (Nagenborg
et al.).2
It is interesting to observe that in Wikipedia this issue is
answered unequivocally: creators of algorithms and a for-
tiori of bots are held accountable. Lengthy procedures
institutionalize this conception. Programmers have to test
their new tools extensively in protected trials. Subsequently
they have to submit their tools to a committee (Bot
Approvals Group, BAG) that asks for logs about the testing
and discusses the tools thoroughly on their talk pages. In
those discussions the possible damage these tools can
inflict on Wikipedian spaces looms large. Letting loose
bots that behave erratically or inflict a lot of damage that
necessitates elaborate reversal operations is not appreci-
ated. The bot involved will be ‘suspended’ (for all remarks
in this paragraph cf. WP:Bot policy).
From the angle of the moral design of robots, an inter-
esting characterization can be made. The vandalism fight-
ing tools that operate autonomously are only allowed to
‘act’ under very strict and limiting conditions: the threshold
of the vandalism probability that triggers action on their
part has to be set high with regard to minimizing the false
positives rate. The underlying argument is that humans are
very sensitive to being falsely reprimanded by a bot. The
BAG is keen on minimizing such occurrences. As a result
of these limitations, many edits that bots are fairly sure
represent vandalism, slip through the net. Hence, much of
the anti-vandalism effort continues to rest on human
shoulders.
Assisted editing tools are indispensable in that regard.
These can be seen to occupy a halfway position between
humans with (non-computational) tools and bots. In cases
like the employment of Huggle and STiki we observe a
fusion between human and computer power. These
instruments can readily be interpreted as emanating from
the conception of ‘coactive design’ (Johnson et al. 2010).
Such design moves away from making bots more autono-
mous; instead, its focal point is to make agents more
capable of joint activity with interdependent people. In the
case of Wikipedia, the sharing reads as follows. Autono-
mous bots reap the low-hanging vandalistic fruit; subse-
quently, humans and bots joined in coactivity reach higher
for the remaining rotten fruit.
Relations of work and power
After this overview of the counter-vandalism mechanisms
installed, I proceed to investigate questions related to chan-
ges inWikipedian governance as a result. First, how does the
revamped monitoring system change the ways in which
contributors work together on expanding and refining the
Wikipedian repository (relations of work)? To answer this
question I rely on a former analysis of mine of the manage-
ment of trust within open-content communities (de Laat
2014; cf. also de Laat 2010, 2012b).3 I argued thatWikipedia
from the start has opted for a policy of fully open read- and
write-access for all. This is an institutional gesture of trust
towards participants: the gesture signals that they are
assumed to be trustworthy in both a moral and an
epistemological sense. The introduction of surveillance
around the clock for each and every freshly contributed edit
significantly qualifies the former gesture. New edits are no
longer reviewed casually, as it were, whenever a fellow
Wikipedian happens to walk by; now they are put under
almost immediate scrutiny. Edits successively have to pass
the edit filters installed, survive the swift perusal by
autonomous bots like ClueBotNG, and withstand scrutiny
from patrollers that preferably use tools like Huggle and
STiki. All this is done with one single purpose in mind:
keeping Wikipedian namespaces free of damaging contri-
butions. The dominant concern is damage avoidance. While
before the platform was completely unprotected from van-
dals, now an army of silicon and human patrollers stands
ready to prevent intrusions. Thereby the grant of discretion to
ordinary users, as the exercise of one’s skills and judgment,
has changed. They still have full powers of contributing the
contents they wish; full write-access still obtains. At the
same time, however, an immediate vandalism check is likely
to be performed. As a result, their discretion has been
reduced; not by eliminating any of the Wikipedian editing
permissions but by much faster performance review.
While keeping this conclusion in mind, another question
immediately imposes itself: who actually have obtained the
powers to exercise this scrutiny of fresh edits using the
anti-vandalism tools available? Who are these gatekeepers
who arguably qualify the powers of the ordinary Wikipe-
dian? And, as a consequence, what changes can be
observed in the amount of influence on the day-to-day
production of entries as exercised by the various levels
involved? As it turns out, by no means anyone is entitled to
watch the gates with all available tools; on the contrary.
The basic rationale underlying the distribution of counter-
vandalism tools is the following. Just by pressing some
2 Precise references to all authors just mentioned can be found in
Johnson (2013).
3 The remainder of this paragraph is a short abstract of de Laat
(2014). For full substantiation of the steps in the argumentation that
follows one is referred to the article itself.
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buttons, these tools may potentially inflict much damage on
Wikipedian namespaces. The stronger the tools are, the
more harm can be done. Therefore, the stronger tools are
basically granted to administrators only, and to those who
can prove (as a rule to those same administrators) that they
are trustworthy enough for the patrolling task. This line of
reasoning applies in particular to tools developed earlier
such as the rollback permission, and to tools developed
later such as those geared towards assisted editing (Huggle,
STiki).
Let me give an indication of the numbers involved.
Against a backdrop of millions of ordinary contributors (of
which over 22 million have registered), currently about
1400 administrators are active; by default they all have the
rollback permission. In addition, they granted that permis-
sion to almost 5000 other users (WP:Wikipedians). For
the—arguably stronger—Huggle and STiki tools the num-
bers that have obtained permission to use them are con-
siderably less: currently each tool may be used by about 800
trusted users in total (note that rollbackers obtain the per-
mission by default if they care to ask for it). It turns out that
once permission has been obtained, subsequently only some
10–20 % of them actively use the acquired tool(s) over a
longer period.
The common Wikipedian, though, has to contend him-
self with the display of suspect edits through #cvn-wp-en
or Lupin, and the filter & button affordances that tools such
as Lupin and Twinkle offer; only the modest tools in the
anti-vandalism Wikipedian repertoire are readily available
to those who care to take up patrolling. With this conclu-
sion I challenge, therefore, the observation by Livingstone
(2012: 213) that ‘‘as watching functions are […] available
to all users, the control element of surveillance remains
largely distributed across the [Wikipedian] site.’’ He sim-
ply overlooks the harsh requirements (in terms of editing
experience) for obtaining effective patrolling tools.
In sum, institutional trust to watch on fresh edits (as a
specific kind of editing) extends to anyone—but the
sophisticated heavy instrumentation that effective watch
requires is only entrusted to the selected few that have
actually proved to be trustworthy members of the com-
munity. Can this arrangement be justified? Of course,
administrators could no longer handle the vandalism
problem on their own. They were in need of more eyeballs
to watch the bugs (i.e., vandalistic edits) injected into the
Wikipedian corpus of entries (and beyond). They then
chose to recruit a special police force, and arm them with
dedicated and powerful weapons. This, of course, created a
new layer in the otherwise rather flat Wikipedian hierarchy,
basically only consisting of administrators and common
users. Was the disturbance of the valuable asset of largely
egalitarian relations a necessity in view of the struggle
against vandalism? Can the unbalancing of power relations
be justified by the argument that the integrity of Wikipedia
is to be maintained? At the end I return to these questions,
which allows us to take other factors into consideration as
well, such as several troubling aspects of the implemented
surveillance and the opaqueness of the anti-vandalism
system as a whole (to be discussed).
Surveillance
After this overview of the tools against vandalism and their
users, it is time to ask the question: does the surveillance in
place respect moral intuitions? In the following I maintain
that both the use of editing tools by humans and the
practices of bots raise serious ethical concerns.
Profiling
A first problem emanates from the phase of selecting
possible candidates for vandalism. Sorting out bad edits
may proceed on the basis of edit characteristics: language
features, textual features, and the like. Whether incorp-
orated in filters or full blown algorithms, the practice seems
unproblematic: after all, vandalism detection is all about
spotting non-appropriate textual edits. Sorting, however,
can also proceed on the basis of editor characteristics.
Whenever these relate to the user’s past behaviour in
regard to vandalism (being warned before, on a blacklist,
and the like), or to the user’s present behaviour arousing
suspicion (e.g., omitting an edit commentary when this
reasonably seems indicated), the method is uncontrover-
sial. I would argue that even an enabled focus on new
accounts can be defended: full credit as a trustworthy
contributor does not have to be given straight away. But a
few other editor characteristics used for closer inspection
do seem controversial.
What are we to think of a criterion such as being a non-
registered user (anonymous, with IP-account only)? Fil-
tering out anonymous contributors is enabled in many a tool
(Vandal Fighter, #cvn-wp-en, and Lupin). Confronted with
an avalanche of fresh edits on the screen a patroller may
easily make a choice and focus specifically on anonymous
users (such edits are usually indicated by a special colour).
For the dedicated chaser of ‘anons’ (as anonymous con-
tributors are called in Wikipedian parlance) there is even a
website that exclusively displays anonymous edits in real-
time from all over the world, with the precise country where
they are committed (RCMap at http://rcmap.hatnote.com;
not in Table 1); with one click they pop up on one’s screen
ready for inspection. In all these instances the choosing of
edits submitted by IP-accounts is a very alluring option to a
patroller in view of the returns it may bring (since such
accounts are known to be more vandalism-prone).
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In a more sophisticated fashion, several assisted editing
tools (Huggle, STiki) offer their operators a queue of edits
that have already been filtered and ordered according to an
algorithm that, besides many other factors, includes ano-
nymity as a warning sign. So routinely, for the designers of
these tools, being an unregistered user triggers extra suspi-
cion and generates an increase in surveillance. There can
even be a subtle multiplier effect at work here, specifically
for these tools. When using the priority queue in Huggle or
STiki (or WPCVN as well), operators can actually see
whether the suspect edit on top of the queue is performed
anonymously or not, and may—whether unconsciously or
not—proceed to give it extra scrutiny. In these instances,
effectively, anonymous edits are given amore severe check.
Letme stress that it is not farfetched to assume that human
patrollers, whether using simpler tools likeVandal Fighter or
more sophisticated assisted editing tools, will indeed choose
to weigh the odds against anonymous users. In many dis-
cussions about vandalism, considerable aggression is venti-
lated against supposed vandals, and anonymous users are
often depicted as being almost synonymouswith vandals (cf.
various quotes in de Laat 2012a).
Now, what is the problem I want to stipulate here? All
practices of filtering as just described are instances of
profiling: an ensemble of dimensions is bundled together
into what is called a profile that by design based on past
experience yields higher chances of catching vandals than
just random screening (for an elaborate discussion of pro-
filing cf. Schauer 2003). Such profiling is understandable
and justifiable, given the quest for optimal detection of
vandalism using scarce resources. In many of these pro-
files, however, whether consisting of just one or of many
dimensions, anonymity figures as an important feature.
This is simply due to the fact that anonymous contributors
(contributing about 15 % of all edits) demonstrably com-
mit much more vandalism than users operating from a
registered account; including anonymity in a profile then
produces more ‘hits’ and eliminates more instances of
vandalism. Nevertheless, such profiling on anonymity
seems questionable, since it risks enhancing stigmatisation
of contributors who for one reason or another choose to
remain anonymous. Anonymous users turn into a category
to be treated with ever growing suspicion.4
Many of us condemn our police forces for relying on
profiles that include the criterion of race and our custom
authorities at airports for using profiles that include ethnic
and religious criteria. Incorporating such ‘sensitive’
dimensions, the argument goes, can only aggravate existing
social tensions. Shouldn’t we similarly condemn profiling
along the lines of anonymity in the Wikipedian case?
A comparison with the Turnitin plagiarism detection
system as discussed by Vanacker (2011) may be useful
here. Often, students in class are required to submit their
papers to the system, in order to preclude plagiarism. Is such
a practice permissible the author asks? He answers that it is,
since the checks are to the benefit of the whole educational
system and uphold the value of their certificates. This would
be otherwise, he remarks, if only ‘‘student athletes or
transfer students’’ were to be singled out for inspection of
their papers (idem: 329). I subscribe to his position, in view
of the divisions that would otherwise be created. And on
condition that we accept the analogy between plagiarism
and vandalism, we are obliged to extend the same stance to
Wikipedia: profiling along the lines of anonymity, although
purportedly contributing to more efficient detection of
vandalism, is to be avoided since it relays the message that
anonymous contributors are up to no good.
Some more questionable profiling is taking place, though
on a minor scale compared to the focused attention on edits
from IP-accounts. The time and place an edit was made are
also singled out as criteria for increased vigilance: the
metadata-based queue in STiki uses a classifier that
incorporates these data. The rationale is that vandalism
appears to occur more regularly during specific time inter-
vals (between 8AM and 8PM, and during weekdays as
opposed to weekends), yielding time-of-day and day-of-the-
week as indicators. Further, vandalism to EnglishWikipedia
has been observed to bemore prevalent among American (as
well as Canadian and Australian) users than among Euro-
pean (Italian, French, or German) users; so being American
turns into awarning sign (for both kinds of data cf.West et al.
2010). In combination, therefore, we observe the following,
STiki-specific profiling: being an American contributing to
Wikipedia during regular work hours is raising suspicion per
se and triggers increased vigilance.
Reputation
Further, the use of a reputational measure is questionable.
For the moment, it has only been used as a scoring tool in
assisted editing (STiki), not in bots since its incorporation
in them appears problematic. The measure orders the queue
that is displayed to its human operators. Apart from being a
very complex and very expensive undertaking since by
definition it amounts to real time computing, the concept of
reputation itself seems hard to operationalize. Based on the
Wikitrust model a measure for reputation has been pro-
posed, roughly the sum total of edits by a specific con-
tributor that have survived the testing by subsequent editors
4 Note that anonymous accounts are not necessarily new accounts (a
factor just mentioned as a justifiable element in a profile). Many IP-
accounts belong to institutions (educational or otherwise) that grant
their members collective access to Wikipedia. Vandalism may then
erupt at the first edit, but just as well only many edits later, whenever
a malevolent individual member of the institution decides to access
Wikipedia and commit a vandalistic edit.
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and remained intact. Since then, a whole literature has been
developing about the issue, and ever more subtle measures
are being proposed.
Two tricky issues, though, are connected with the
reputational measure (for both issues cf. de Laat 2014;
based on West et al. 2012, Adler and de Alfaro 2007). In
order to explain this, its meaning and functions more
generally first have to be spelled out. Reputation is not a
particular characteristic of an editor at the moment that
(s)he submits a specific edit (as in other vandalism algo-
rithms), but it indicates a current summary of all of
someone’s achievements so far in the community. It is
intended to be a measure of what can be expected from him
or her. As such it can be used more broadly than just as an
indicator for possible vandalism: to motivate members to
continue performing, to regulate the distribution of editing
privileges, to promote contributors to higher ranks, etc.
Used in these ways, reputation becomes decisive for one’s
whole career in the community (cf. de Laat 2014).
After this short detour the first tricky issue connected
with using reputation as an intelligent routing tool for
detecting vandalism can be spelled out: is the measure to
be made publicly available or is reputation to be tracked in
silence? The first option has much to say for it. For one
thing, it would satisfy principles of openness and trans-
parency, which are clearly desirable given the broad
importance of the measure for one’s life chances in the
institution. For another, it allows reputation to function as
an incentive for proper behaviour – much like in eBay. As
mentioned above, seeing one’s efforts reflected in (higher)
reputation is supposed to be stimulating. Unfortunately,
such visibility would at the same time invite ‘gaming’ the
system in various ways (such as by dividing a contribution
into smaller consecutive edits) and thereby undermine the
measure’s accuracy. As yet, no solutions to such vulner-
abilities have been found. Switching to the alternative of
tracking reputation in silence, then, is the other option—
similar to how things are presently done in some corners of
Wikipedia. However, although gaming the system is no
longer an issue, any incentive for proper behaviour would
be eliminated. More importantly, transparency would be
forfeited. So one way or another, efficiency and morality
always seem to clash here: either the measure conforms to
moral standards but is not very efficient (public reputation),
or the measure is reasonably accurate but violates moral
intuitions considerably (secret reputation).5
The second thorny issue connected with any measure of
reputation is a technical issue: which starting value is to be
chosen? Putting it in short terms: given its range (say from
0 to 1) a starting value at the middle (1/2) is preferable,
with this value going up and down as a contributor’s
actions unfold. Unfortunately, this allows vandals after
‘bankruptcy’ to start all over again from a new account. So
this option does not deter any vandalism. Starting at value
zero avoids this problem; but then newcomers and vandals
receive the same kind of vigilance, which is clearly sub-
optimal (as well as slightly immoral).
In view of these problems, any measure of reputation is
bound to be problematic. Its use as the basis for queuing
would amount to a capricious and haphazard surveillance
practice. No wonder, that after some try outs on dumps
from Wikipedia for research purposes, apart from use in
WPCVN and STiki, as of today reputational algorithms are
nowhere in use in Wikipedia.
Oversurveillance
Yet another moral issue has to do with a tendency towards
overuse. As anti-vandalism tools become stronger and
more sophisticated, they are more easily prone to be
overused; as a result, quantity trumps quality, defeating the
original purpose of these tools. Let me explain.
First consider assisted editing tools like Huggle and
STiki. Since they display new edits in an instant (the ever
present priority queue), they represent an invitation to treat
edits ever faster. One may always press the buttons
involved faster and faster. The practice turns into a com-
puter game that may properly be called ‘shooting the
vandals’. Unwittingly or not, STiki in particular is specif-
ically stimulating such practice, by maintaining daily
leader boards of STiki editors that display the amount of
edits treated by them and the actual reversion scores
obtained (WP:STIKI/L). ‘Gamification’ has taken hold of
the patrolling domain. Some troubling figures emerge from
these leader boards. Some patrollers treat hundreds of
suspect edits a day (on average). Actual reversion scores on
account of vandalism vary wildly between STiki patrollers:
from a modest 5 % up to 80 and 90 %. And it has to be
borne in mind in this regard that the edit queue cannot be
chosen here; there is always just one obligatory next edit a
patroller cannot escape from. I would argue that the fig-
ures yield reasonable indications of overuse of the tool by
at least some patrollers.6
A parallel tendency applies to bots. Bots too can be
turned into overzealous patrollers. That is to say, their
parameters for action can be tuned in order to increase the
catch of vandalistic edits; whether innocent edits are
5 Note that I come back to the transparency vs. obscurity issue below,
since it pertains to the anti-vandalism system as a whole, not just to
the use of reputation in an engine for detecting vandalism.
6 Playing games is the province of men rather than women. Would
the tendency toward gamification signalled above by any chance
reflect or even reinforce the current male predominance in the
Wikipedian population as a whole? (Thanks for this suggestion are
due to an anonymous reviewer of this journal).
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eliminated in the process matters less. Or in technical
terms: the tracking rate (‘recall’) is set ever higher, at the
expense of the false positives rate also rising. It has to be
mentioned here that this problem of fine-tuning has not
gone unnoticed in Wikipedia. The Bot Approvals Group
has discussed the issue at length, and maintains a rule that
bots should have a false positives rate at most equal to the
rate that humans achieve in practice.7 A bot should perform
better than humans, in the sense of hardly bothering
innocent editors—not so much in terms of the number of
vandals caught.
With both humans and bots potentially overstretching
their reach, one should not lose sight of the fact that the
basic algorithms underlying their patrolling actions are
often generated by machine learning. The rationale of such
results is inherently opaque: neural networks just learn in
their machine way. The results can be surprising, even to
their creators. I have no specific evidence of this happen-
ing, but it is an aspect worth keeping in mind.
Bots taking over
Over the last few years, there has been a notable tendency
of bots taking over the chores of vandalism fighting from
humans. According to recent estimates bots already elim-
inate half of all vandalistic contributions. Numerous are the
messages from human patrollers on the bots’ talk pages,
congratulating them on their speed and accuracy. This
advance of the bots has several troubling aspects.
First, patrolling against vandalism is not only a technical
task, of adequately identifying a vandalistic edit and taking
appropriate action. If done well, it also demands the
exercise of moral skills that make up the character of the
virtuous patroller (for the introduction of this term in the
context of new technology cf. Vallor 2015). These have to
do with displaying restraint, with being tactful, forgiving,
and supportive in gentle ways. Not all supposed vandals are
what they seem to be. By exercising these skills, well-
meaning newcomers may be saved for the Wikipedian
project, instead of being pushed away, never to come back.
With bots taking over, then, we may ask whether the
required moral skills are exercised at all. After all, the
present bots just leave behind preformatted templates,
delivered and signed by a name ending with BOT. Such a
treatment can hardly be considered inviting. It has been
observed, similarly, that already one-third of newcomers to
Wikipedia obtain their first return messages from a bot.
Significantly, many human users ‘caught’ by an anti-van-
dalism bot are reported as trying to talk back to the bot—
overlooking the bot label.
Secondly, in line with the foregoing, if bots really take
over from humans in the future, the associated moral skills
may well be lost among human patrollers themselves: such
skills erode when not in use. Patrolling vandals is—and
should be—a continuous practice in restraint and diplo-
macy. That kind of schooling is in danger of fading away.
All that remains then is the metal tone of the bots scouting
Wikipedia on their own.
Bots taking over, though, is not really the policy at
Wikipedia. Out of fear of alienating too many potential
contributors, bots may only revert the very high probabil-
ities; any edits scoring lower are left for human patrollers.
‘Coactivity’ of algorithmic power and humans is the cur-
rent policy (cf. above).
This is a fortunate trend. After all, what is vandalism,
let alone obvious vandalism? An edit per se can (almost)
never be labelled vandalism. Any change of numbers; any
change of names; any change of web link; any paragraphs
added or deleted—it all depends on the context as to
whether this is vandalism or not. And associated with this,
any vandalism can only be obvious to a patroller who is
familiar with the context. Let me quote from my own
experience. Changing the number of Jews murdered in
WWII from 6 million to 6 thousand is an obvious bad faith
vandalistic change to me—but not every patroller is
familiar with WWII. The number change I came across that
took place in the sales figures of a particular company
turned out to be vandalism as well. But this was not
obvious to me since I am not acquainted with that type of
company; I had to do some research before reaching my
verdict. Similarly, the deletion of several paragraphs in a
specific entry without leaving a comment seemed obvious
vandalism to me at first; any other patroller would draw the
same conclusion. Then it emerged that the editor involved
had been talking it out on the associated talk page; the
deletions were part of a consensus for action reached there.
(S)he protested and I had to apologize and revert my own
reversion of the deletion. These musings serve to underline
that the trend in Wikipedia to include both bots and humans
in patrolling is a fortunate one indeed—vandalism detec-
tion can never be automatic and foolproof at the same time.
Wikipedia as a Janus-faced institution
The—to my view—most alarming aspect of the Wikipe-
dian anti-vandalism system as a whole is the air of secrecy
and opaqueness in which it operates. In order to develop
this argument it is most appropriate to portray the
encyclopedia as a Janus-faced institution. As Johnson
7 Human Wikipedians roughly achieve a false positives rate of
0.25 %: one in 400 legitimate edits is mistakenly classified as a
vandalistic edit. ClueBotNG initially started off with the same false
positives rate. By now, this rate has been lowered to 0.1 %; that is, at
most one in 1000 legitimate edits is mistakenly identified as a
vandalistic edit (WP:CLUEBOT).
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(2004) has argued, evolving ICT impinges on the instru-
mentation of human action, by creating new ways for doing
the things we can do already as well as possibilities for
doing novel things. In the case of Wikipedia the advance of
the associated technologies has resulted in a particular
instrumentation of human action: the tools for human
action may be interpreted as having bifurcated into two
contrasting types.As a result, the institution has acquired two
quite opposed faces. The contrast may usefully be drawn out
by taking recourse to the distinction between transparent
technologies on the one hand and opaque technologies on the
other, as elaborated by Lucas Introna in the context of the
politics of surveillance cameras (Introna 2005).
The basic platform of Wikipedia (an implementation of
MediaWiki software), consisting of main pages, talk pages
and the like, presents itself in an accessible way to all users
alike. They are invited to become involved and assist in
developing entries. Further, all contributions are logged and
publicly available. So transparency can be said to reign.
Things are quite otherwise for the whole array of anti-van-
dalism tools, whether humanly operated or fully autonomous
bots. For one thing, these tools are normally hidden from
view: as long as co-creative editing goes smoothly, nobody
will notice that checking for vandalism is taking place con-
tinuously. Only when humans or bots start to interfere by
carrying out reverts and/or leaving warning templates, will
participants become aware of the patrolling in the back-
ground. As well, the patrolling is a form of surveillance that
does not need any extra involvement from the surveilled;
they can just carry on their editing. Finally, and most
importantly, operation and outcomes of the tools are most
obscure. The operation is steered by a variety of algorithms;
the more sophisticated they become, the more opaque they
are (cf. metadata algorithms and neural networks). Theymay
properly be considered black boxes in their own right. So I
argue that taken together the set of anti-vandalism tools in
use can aptly be denominated an opaque technology. The
Wikipedian technologies involved arguably follow closely
the distinctions laid out by Introna. It is worth noticing here
that earlier I denominated the second face a ‘background’
mechanism (de Laat 2012b), and Geiger (2011) referred to it
as the ‘hidden order’ of Wikipedia—though he mainly had
bots in view.
Another difference between the two Janus faces has to
do with the purposes of the technology involved. The
Wikipedian platform on the surface exemplifies the invi-
tation for all to collaborate on entries and let the ency-
clopedia prosper. ‘‘We trust you all’’ is the signal it emits.
The array of surveillance practices below the surface,
however, is the embodiment of suspicion. Edits from (al-
most) all contributors are systematically checked, behind
their backs, in order to avoid possible damage. The system
of surveillance signals: ‘‘You are to be watched closely.’’
This contrast, added to the transparent-opaque distinction
drawn by Introna, only serves to accentuate the tension
between the two faces.
Remarkably, the two faces are also decoupled techno-
logically. The MediaWiki platform on the one hand and the
anti-vandalism tools on the other are not a technologically
integrated system. The latter tools are simply a collection
of browser extensions, standalone programs, and bots,
installed on and operated by the individual patrollers’
computers. While not running on the Wikipedian servers,
they do not impede the platform’s performance. Geiger
dubs this ‘bespoke code’ and estimates that the number of
lines of code involved in all of them together is higher than
the size of the code base of the MediaWiki platform itself
(Geiger 2014). Notice though that edit filters (cf. above) as
part of the anti-vandalism system are the exception to this
rule: they run directly on the Wikipedian platform.
This contrast between the transparent wiki face and the
opaque anti-vandalism patrolling face of Wikipedia is rela-
ted to a dichotomy signalled by Stegbauer (2011). His thesis
is that the encyclopedia’s ideology is gradually changing
from an ‘emancipation ideology’ which stresses that
everybody is welcome to contribute, to a ‘production
ideology’ emphasizing that high-grade entries have to be
produced. The former ideology developed in Wikipedia’s
earlier years; later on, with the size of the encyclopedia
growing beyond comprehension, the latter ideology took
hold. It became embodied in the appointment of adminis-
trators with the powers to protect pages and block users:
they keep a watchful eye over vandals, trolls, IPs, and dif-
ficult and unreasonable people in general. As a result, as of
now, newcomers have an ambiguous experience. The
emancipation ideology entices them to participate (‘the
encyclopedia that everybody can edit’); subsequently, they
have the sobering experience of a myriad of rules they have
to follow and a range of functionaries they have to obey.
Notice in this regard that in my interpretation of the recent
discussion among Wikipedians about a system of reviewing
edits before they appear on the screen (the so-called flagged-
revisions scheme) a similar dichotomy between ‘process’
and ‘product’ ideology surfaced (cf. de Laat 2012a).8 The
connection of the Stegbauer thesis with the growth of anti-
vandalism tools and the recruitment of patrollers in
particular may be clear: such patrolling is only the latest step
in the expansion of the hold of the ‘product ideology’.
This Stegbauer thesis about Wikipedia is an exciting one.
It is tempting to go one step further and interpret it as a
particular instance of the Iron Law of Oligarchy as
8 For a broad overview of the bureaucratic problems facing
Wikipedia see Simonite (2013). In the article these problems are
argued to be (partly) responsible for the declining number of editors
and the continuing lack of editor diversity (predominantly male,
technologically-minded, and from the Western hemisphere).
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formulated by Robert Michels in 1911. According to that
law, all organisations, whether or not of democratic origin—
like trade unions and political parties, tend to evolve towards
oligarchy. Would that law by any chance also hold for web-
based open content communities—Wikipedia in particular?
Obviously, this opaqueness of the anti-vandalistic face
of the Wikipedian institution goes against the basic prin-
ciples of transparency and accountability. Wikipedia, in
particular, as a site that projects itself as an encyclopedia
for all, cannot allow itself to just slide away, step by step,
into developing surveillance practices in the background
that operate ever so silently and opaquely. This threatens to
erode Wikipedia’s moral order as a whole. In a democratic
institution such practices cry out for clarification and jus-
tification, for the exercise of democratic control.
Conclusions
It has been argued that in Wikipedia surveillance in order
to fight vandalism has assumed morally questionable pro-
portions. In the process, some users have established
themselves as more powerful actors than others. Profiling
of anonymous users has become a routine procedure;
questionable measures of reputation have also come under
consideration for surveillance purposes. Further, overzeal-
ous patrollers and/or bots may become a nuisance for good
faith contributors. As well, the ever needed moral skills in
‘treating’ vandalism are in danger of being eroded. Finally,
an air of secrecy and opaqueness surrounds the whole
patrolling venture, in particular as a result of the anti-
vandalism algorithms and neural networks in use that are
opaque to all concerned—ordinary users and experts alike.
All of this is in need of public discussion.
Some may argue at this point (or already earlier on), that
mystery or no mystery, vandalism is an evil that may
destroy the reliability of Wikipedia as an encyclopedia for
all. Reliability that has been built up gradually is in danger
of being eroded. Of course I can only agree with this
diagnosis—without considerable anti-vandalism efforts the
encyclopedia would have been doomed to failure a long
time ago already. The whole point is, however, whether
this threat alone is enough to force us to swallow any
amount and any type of such activities unfolding, thereby
effectively closing the discussion. I would argue that
instead a more nuanced and extended discussion should
take place about the pros and cons of the several aspects of
surveillance. We should seek to acquire a better balance
concerning the various issues involved.
Such discussion, however, is severely hampered precisely
by the opaqueness in which the whole anti-vandalism
technological apparatus is clouded. That mystery is not only
objectionable in itself; it likewise hampers public discussion
developing about the pros and cons of such patrolling.
Similar observations about ‘obscure’ technologies as
immune to public scrutiny can be found in Introna (2005)
concerning surveillance cameras, and in Stahl et al. (2010)
concerning computer security and computer forensics. It is
also the same kind of conclusion as Friedland (2014), a
lawyer, writing after the Snowden revelations, draws con-
cerning modern day surveillance practices and privacy. He
argues that these practices become more and more invisible.
Thus, the targets of surveillance (i.e., all of us) have no
knowledge of being surveilled and see no reason to raise
their voices. As a result, the necessary exercise of their
democratic rights of speech is thwarted. Only transparency
can do justice to the intentions as worded in the US con-
stitution, and enable a fine-tuning of checks and balances
concerning privacy in this age of omni-present surveillance.
The foregoing comparison is not in any way intended to
suggest that the hidden face of Wikipedia is of comparable
importance or causes similar harm as the hidden face(s) of
current surveillance practices—such is obviously not the
case. Nor is this to suggest that Wikipedia as an institution
operates as mysteriously and in the dark as the secret ser-
vices of the Western nations. At various spots on Wiki-
pedia details of its practices of collective monitoring are
documented and even discussed—absolute secrecy or
confidentiality does not apply. If they persist, diligent
Wikipedian users can take up their accountability in this
and piece together information about the anti-vandalism
tools that are operative—at least if they have the time and
energy to invest in the undertaking. A serious obstacle to
overcome though is the circumstance that such information
is very much scattered all over Wikipedian namespaces.9
In order for this discussion to unfold I would argue that
Wikipedian functionaries (whether paid or unpaid) have a
special responsibility—after all, they are running the day-to-
day affairs of the encyclopedic site. In taking up this
responsibility they must as it were put effort into reverting
any (natural) trend towards oligarchy—thereby testifying to
the fact that Robert Michels’ law may not be an iron law after
all. One cannot expect from an ordinary Wikipedian that he/
she takes the lead in such matters. I have to grant that many
discussions about various such issues are already being
conducted all over the place—but it is mainly the seasoned
Wikipedians who know where to find them and how to take
part in them. The enlargement of the base of discussants and
9 The hardest nut to crack is the opaqueness of the algorithms in use:
the inner workings of tools like Huggle and STiki, as well as
autonomous bots, can only be grasped fully by actually putting the
tools to use and seeing what happens. For that reason I have invested
time in actually patrolling Wikipedia with them and finding out the
intricate details involved.
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the mutual coordination of—now scattered—discussions
about (algorithmic) transparency would seem to be
imperative.
At any rate, whatever the outcome of this rebalancing
discussion, the Wikipedian community has to develop more
ethical information practices towards its contributors. As of
now they are cordially invited to contribute and enjoy the
collaborative process—be bold is the motto. In the process,
they are urged to remain polite, to do no harm, and to respect
copyright laws. Consent (implicit, informed consent that is)
is only sought for handing over their edits with a Creative
Commons License 3.0 (CC-BY-SA), which stipulates that
other users may read, distribute, and modify the edit (while
attaching the same license again) (for all the above see
Wmf:Terms of Use). But no consent is sought for the ways in
which their personal edits are used and processed subse-
quently; only some vague allusions to this can be found in the
privacy policy that applies (Wmf:Privacy Policy).
A comparison might be useful here. In his discussion
about the morality of using Turnitin software against pla-
giarism, Vanacker (2011) argues that ‘fair information
principles’ would require the institution to develop a ‘code
of ethics’ for instructors in the classroom. His discussion,
however, mainly revolves around the use of personal data
and concerns of privacy. Our case, however, is neither
about personal data (in the strict sense), nor about privacy.
It is about the several ways in which the data about their
personal edits are employed for anti-vandalism purposes.
Accordingly, contributors have to be warned about this.
They have to be made aware that their edits are routinely
surveilled in order to detect vandalism, by a multitude of
human patrollers and autonomous bots. Mistakes, they
must be told, are inevitable (false positives). Moreover,
they should be alerted to the fact that secondary use is
involved as well. Both edit and editor data are used as input
for several machine learning tools associated with Wiki-
pedia, can be aggregated into a measure of reputation,
and—a point not mentioned before—can be downloaded
by any computer scientist who wants to analyse dumps of
Wikipedian data for research purposes. A whole spectrum
of secondary use of information is at stake.
Potential editors, then, must be presented an explicit
choice: a basic opt-in that grants consent to the anti-van-
dalism practices employed, a more expanded opt-in that
grants consent to secondary uses as well—or refrain from
participation. Other options (such as just submitting one’s
edit-as-is, without allowing any further processing) are
simply not feasible.
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